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Further Developments in Land Use Ethics
Patricia E. Salkin* and Darren Stakey**
I. Introduction
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONTINUE TO PLAY A FUNDAMENTAL ROLE in shap-
ing the course of land use and developmental regulatory proceedings
throughout the country. From an innocuous donation by one public of-
ficial to his alma mater,1 to the outright bribery of a former mayor,2
the past year has been rife with a range of conduct implicating profes-
sional responsibility and land use.
II. Conflicts of Interest
A. Attorney Conflicts
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, a New Jersey appellate court
found that it was not a conflict for an attorney to accept the endorse-
ment of his former client, then-mayor, for a municipal attorney posi-
tion, and that, similarly, the mayor had not acted improperly.3
A complaint was first filed against Scott M. Alexander, the then-
mayor of the Borough of Haddon Heights, alleging that he “violated
the Local Government Ethics Law by proposing and supporting [a
candidate for] Borough[] Solicitor” who had represented him in a fam-
ily law matter.4 With the mayor’s support, the Haddon Heights Bor-
ough Council undertook a public vote and resolved to allocate an an-
nual retainer for Robert Gleaner, the attorney, which covered
“attendance at public meetings . . . and his ‘interactions’ with officials
and citizens,” and set “an hourly rate of $150 for litigation or special
* Dean and Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center;
chair of the ABA State and Local Government Law Section’s Committee on Ethics
in Land Use.
** 2015 graduate of Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; N.Y. Pro
Bono Scholar, inaugural class; clerk to Chief Justice Saylor of the Supreme Court
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
1. Shain v. Lakewood Twp. Plan. Bd., No. A-6335-11T3, 2014 WL 1613668 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2014).
2. In re Cammarano, 219 N.J. 415 (N.J. 2014).
3. Scoblink-O’Neill v. Loc. Fin. Bd., Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, No. A-4754-11T4,
2014 WL 6802452, at *3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Dec. 4, 2014).
4. Id. at *1.
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projects.”5 The now-former mayor defended the endorsement of his
personal lawyer in a letter, responding that the Advisory Committee
on Professional Ethics of the New Jersey Supreme Court already
ruled that “an attorney is ethically permitted to represent a municipal
official in any matter that is unrelated to the municipality.”6 Further,
the mayor contended that there were no situations flowing from Mr.
Gleaner’s municipal representation in which a “direct financial or per-
sonal involvement . . . had impaired [either party’s] objectivity or in-
dependence of judgment.”7
In reviewing the matter, the Legal Finance Board decided that the
relationship between the mayor and the solicitor was too attenuated
“to constitute a ‘prohibit[ed] involvement’ and could not ‘reasonably
be expected to impair’ the Mayor’s ‘objectivity or independence of
judgment.’ ”8 On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate
Division, concurred with the Finance Board that the relationship be-
tween the mayor and his lawyer “was ‘too tenuous’ to support a vio-
lation.”9 The court also found nothing unusual with regard to the attor-
ney’s fees charged and noted that nothing in the record tended to
suggest that the prior representation affected any public interest per-
taining to the municipality.10
In Connecticut, allegations of impropriety were rejected where the fa-
ther of a zoning board chairperson’s son-in-law served as personal attor-
ney for an applicant whose request for variances was approved.11 The
original application submitted to the Fairfield Zoning Board of Appeals
was for variances that would “permit the construction of a single-family
residence on [an] unimproved parcel” in a flood plain zone.12 Ulti-
mately, however, the applicant, through his lawyer, sought permission
to construct a three-story commercial building entirely within the
flood zone.13 At the “close of a public hearing, the Board . . . ap-
prove[d] the requested variances” and “the decision was published in




8. Id. at *2.
9. Id. at *3.
10. See id.
11. See Coppola v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. CV116023195S, 2014 WL
2055635, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2014).
12. Id. at *1.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *2.
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Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, held that five of the
residents had standing due to the close proximity of their property to the
subject parcel.15 Though the court determined that the applicant’s prop-
erty was not entitled to preexisting nonconforming use status because
the previous use had been abandoned for several years, it rejected the
argument that the affirmatively-voting chairman of the Zoning Board
of Appeals had a conflict of interest simply because the father of his
son-in-law was the applicant’s attorney.16 The court asserted that “mu-
nicipal governments would be seriously handicapped[] if any conceiv-
able interest, however remote or speculative, would require the disqua-
lification of a zoning official,” and because there were no personal or
pecuniary interests implicated by the subject matter of the application,
or any relationship with any of the parties who were before the Zoning
Board of Appeals, no violation had occurred.17 Further, as the chairman
was not directly related, by blood or marriage, to the applicant and was
not a part owner of the parcel in question, “the fact that his daughter
[was] married to the son of the personal attorney and cousin of an
owner to the property [was] too attenuated” a basis upon which to main-
tain a personal interest claim against the chairman.18
B. Ex Parte Communications
With increasing frequency, communications have triggered ethical in-
quiries this past year. In the Aloha State, an email exchange between
counsel for the University of Hawai’i and a hearing officer, regarding
the approval of a Conservation District Use Application (CDUA), was
deemed an impermissible ex parte communication.19 Litigation began
shortly after the State of Hawai’i transferred eighteen acres of land to
the University, on condition that the land was being set aside for cre-
ation of the Haleakala High Altitude Observatory.20 The University of
Hawai’i Institute of Astronomy, accordingly, secured a permit to in-
stall a Solar Telescope, but Kilakila ‘O Haleakalâ (KOH), “an organi-
zation dedicated to the protection of the sacredness of the summit of
Haleakalâ[,] opposed [the application] . . . to build on the project
15. See id. at *2-3.
16. Id. at *5-6.
17. See id. at *6-7.
18. Id. at *7.
19. See Kilakila ‘O Haleakalâ v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res. (KOH II), No. CAAP-13-
003065, 2014 WL 5326757, at *3 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2014), cert. granted, No.
SCWC-13-0003065, 2015 WL 114807 (Haw. Jan. 7, 2015).
20. See id. at *2.
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site” and demanded a stay and a contested case hearing, which was
eventually ordered by Hawai’i’s high court.21
KOH then sought, unsuccessfully, to disqualify Board of Land and
Natural Resources advisor and Deputy Attorney General Linda Chow,
due to her prior representation of the Board in a related proceeding
against KOH.22 Around this time, the Board announced that it was
aware of an impermissible email sent by the assigned contested hear-
ing officer, Steven Jacobson, to counsel for the University.23 In the
email, Jacobson stated that the offices of the Governor and of United
States Senator Daniel Inouye had been pressuring him into making a
quick recommendation to grant the permit, and asking counsel for
the University, “So, my question for you is whether any of you had
anything to do with what the Senator’s and Governor’s offices were
doing.”24
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board approved the CDUA to
build an astronomical observation tower and denied KOH’s post-
hearing motion for disclosure of all other communications surrounding
the Solar Telescope, maintaining that pressure placed on Jacobson
“did not influence the outcome of his decision,” while nevertheless
discharging Jacobson for his impermissible ex parte communication
and striking Jacobson’s work product from the record.25 KOH ap-
pealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai’i, which held,
among other things, that “any impropriety was cured when the
Board discharged Jacobson and appointed [a new hearing officer].”26
However, the case is still ongoing, as KOH’s writ of certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court of Hawai’i and has been scheduled
for oral arguments.27
Back on the mainland, in Oregon, the mere appearance of impropri-
ety created by ex parte communications was insufficient to vitiate a
land use board proceeding, when an approved plan to build a gas pipe-
line was later reconsidered.28 This dispute ripened when the Oregon
21. Kilakila ‘O Haleakalâ v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res. (KOH I), 317 P.3d 27, 29, 40
(Haw. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. KOH II, 2014 WL 5326757, at *2.
23. See id.
24. Id. at *2-3.
25. Id. at *5.
26. Id. at *24.
27. Kilakila ‘O Haleakalâ v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res. (KOH III), No. SCWC-13-
0003065, 2015 WL 114807, at *1 (Haw. Jan. 7, 2015).
28. See Columbia Riverkeeper v. Clatsop Cnty., 341 P.3d 790, 804 (Or. Ct. App.
2014).
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Pipeline Company’s petition to build a forty-one mile long segment of
natural gas pipeline, initially approved by the Clatsop County Board of
Commissioners, was appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals
(LUBA) by parties who opposed the application.29 While the appeal
was still pending, three new commissioners were elected to Clatsop
County’s Board, one of whom had openly discussed rejection of the
pipeline plan.30 Before the LUBA was even provided the record for
appeal, “the [B]oard—with its three newly elected commissioners—
voted to withdraw its approval [of the application] and reconsider
[the] decision.”31 The withdrawal was immediately challenged
“through a mandamus action in the circuit court[,] . . . [but] [t]he cir-
cuit court dismissed” and the Supreme Court of Oregon declined to
review.32
On reconsideration, the Board denied the pipeline application in a 4-1
vote.33 The Oregon Pipeline Company appealed, alleging that Commis-
sioner Peter Huhtala had campaigned against the pipeline as part of his
election platform and that his bias had tainted the proceeding.34 The
Company cited more than a half-dozen remarks Commissioner Huhtala
had made, including statements in opposition to land use approvals for a
downstream distribution channel to market the natural gas and a com-
ment that “[i]t could become the policy of the Port of Astoria that we
oppose the construction of a liqu[e]fied natural gas facility anywhere
in the Columbia River Estuary and direct staff to do everything possible
to make that happen.”35 Nevertheless, based on the totality of his state-
ments, the Court of Appeals of Oregon found that Commissioner Huh-
tala never “explicitly, or by necessary implication, commit[ted] to an ir-
revocable position on the merits of [the pipeline] application.”36 Thus,
actual bias was not established and the mere appearance of bias created
by his ex parte statements was insufficient.37
Moving from natural gas to water, ex parte communications made
to officials in Connecticut were deemed sufficient to render a public
29. Id. at 794.
30. See id. at 793.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 793 (citing State ex rel. Or. Pipeline Co. v. Clatsop Cnty., 288 P.3d 1024
(Or. Ct. App. 2012), rev. den., 299 P.3d 889 (Or. 2013)).
33. See id. at 794.
34. See id. at 793.
35. See id. at 804-05.
36. Id. at 808.
37. Id. at 809.
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hearing unfair.38 There, a member of the Enfield Planning and Zoning
Commission, named Lori Longhi, was accused of illegally orchestrat-
ing the denial of an application to construct a thirty-eight unit residen-
tial subdivision.39 Longhi had been a social friend of one of [Villages,
LLC’s] owners, Jeannette Tallarita, and her husband, former Mayor,
Patrick Tallarita, but since had a falling out and was now alleged to
have “arbitrarily predetermined the outcome” of the applications
based on her “personal animus.”40 The rift began when Longhi ac-
cused then-Mayor Peter Tallarita of using his influence to affect the
outcome of Commission decisions in a way adverse to Longhi’s inter-
ests.41 Now, with Patrick Tallarita acting as counsel for Villages, LLC,
Longhi stated that “she wanted [Tallarita] to suffer the same fate of
denial by the commission that she had suffered,” and engaged in ex
parte communications with an official from the Hazardville Water
Company to discuss the issue of whether there was sufficient water
pressure for the fire department to extinguish a blaze at the subdivi-
sion.42 The trial court found that Longhi, who “played a significant
role in deliberations[] and voted to deny the . . . applications,” had a
conflict of interest due to her bias against Tallarita.43 The Appellate
Court of Connecticut agreed, noting that “evidence of bias may be cu-
mulative,” and ruled that Longhi’s ex parte comments were harmful
and deprived Villages, LLC of a fair hearing.44
C. Pecuniary Conflicts
Two contrasting cases from New Jersey last year addressed what does
and does not create a pecuniary conflict of interest. First, it was not a
conflict for the Chairman of the Lakewood Township Planning Board
to make a donation to the school from which he graduated, Beth
Medrash Govoha of America, a specialized graduate level educational
institution, even though the school was subject to Board review and
approval for its expansion plans.45 Neighbors residing across from
the proposed development decried the Board’s approval as being biased,
38. Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 89 A.3d 405, 416-17
(Conn. Ct. App. 2014).
39. See id. at 407-08.
40. Id. at 408.
41. See id. at 408-09.
42. Id. at 408-09 (alteration in original).
43. Id. at 408.
44. Id. at 414, 416-17.
45. Shain v. Lakewood Twp. Planning Bd., No. A-6335-11T3, 2014 WL 1613668,
at *1-2 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2014).
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using as evidence the recent donation made by the Chairman and the
fact that another board member was also an alumnus of the school.46
On appeal, the challenging neighbors relied on a New Jersey Munic-
ipal Land Use provision that “prohibit[s] any member of [a] planning
board” from taking part in a “matter in which [the member] has . . .
any personal or financial interest.”47 The Superior Court of New Jer-
sey, Appellate Division, upheld the Board’s conclusion that no viola-
tion was committed affirming the Board’s approval of the academic
expansion.48
Things turned out very different in another part of New Jersey for
Pemberton Township Councilmember Sherry Scull, who voted on
the salaries of twelve supervisory positions, including the water super-
intendent, despite her husband’s employment with the Pemberton
Township Water Division.49 The Township Solicitor’s office investi-
gated Scull’s affirmative vote for the Communications Workers of
America Salary Ordinance after “the public questioned whether
[Scull] should have recused herself from voting on the contract.”50
The Solicitor’s office ruled that the appellant had no conflict of inter-
est.51 But, the Local Finance Board also lodged a complaint, alleging
that Scull violated the section 40A-9-22.5(d) of the Local Government
Ethics Law.52 The Board ultimately issued a Notice of Violation and
concluded that both Scull and her husband stood to gain from the or-
dinance, which might have “impair[ed their] objectivity or indepen-
dence of judgment.”53 Scull requested a hearing to contest the deter-
mination, and an administrative law judge ruled that Scull had
indeed violated the Local Government Ethics Law when she voted
to increase the salary of her husband’s direct supervisor.54 Scull ap-
pealed to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
which ruled that, even if Scull did not specifically intend to use her
office for the benefit of her husband, the key issue was the existence
of the conflict.55 Scull should have recused herself and, by not
46. See id. at *1.
47. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-23(b) (2015).
48. Shain, 2014 WL 1613668, at *2.
49. See Scull v. Loc. Fin. Bd., No. A-4786-11T4, 2014 WL 2440783, at *1 (N.J.




53. Id. (quoting the Board’s Notice of Violation).
54. Id. at *1.
55. Id. at *5.
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doing so, her vote “presented the potential to undermine the public[’s]
confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the local government
in violation of [the Ethics Law].”56
D. Proprietary Conflicts
A line of advisory opinions from California this past year may help
practitioners to draw that ethical line between right and wrong for con-
flicts of interest created by property ownership. The California Fair
Political Practices Commission weighed in on a potential conflict im-
plicating San Luis Obispo City Council Members Dan Carpenter and
John Ashbaugh, who both owned real property within the boundaries
of an area where the City Council was to award a grant that would im-
pact their property values.57 The Legal Division of the Commission
advised that any government decision directly affecting a financial in-
terest in real property is presumed to be material, unless “rebutted by
proof that it is not reasonably foreseeable” to have “even a ‘penny’s
worth’” of an effect on the property’s value.58 As both council mem-
bers owned property directly within the General Plan Land Use and
Circulation Elements grant zone, both had prohibited conflicts of inter-
est, and neither could participate in the decision until each of their
conflicts was resolved by the City Council using either segmentation
and screening, or a random selection process.59
In light of this advisory opinion, it seems clear that owning property
in an area subject to development creates a conflict of interest for the
public officials charged with approval or rejection of that develop-
ment. But, what if a public official just rents the property subject to
development? That is exactly the issue that the California Fair Politi-
cal Practices Commission grappled with next, when the propriety of
Davis City Councilmember Robb Davis was called into question last
year.60 Davis was newly elected and had rented a loft for a one-year
term in “the downtown core area of Davis.”61 The potential conflict
arose quickly, as there were a number of projects near Davis’ rented
residence slated for consideration.62
56. Id.
57. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n Advice Letter, No. A-13-160, 2014 WL
764125, at *1-2 (Feb. 10, 2014).
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id. at *7.
60. See Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n Advice Letter, No. A-14-175, 2014
WL 5797812, at *1 (Oct. 20, 2014).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Using the standard of reasonable foreseeability, the Legal Division
of California’s Fair Political Practices Commission reasoned that
Davis’ leasehold did not “have a material financial effect on [his po-
litical] interest” in the development, because Davis’ lease was non-
renewable.63 Thus, even if Davis were to negotiate a new lease in the
same space after the expiration of his current term, the councilmember
would have no present conflict of interest in debating and voting on
projects that directly affected the value of the property he leased.64
Another issue still: what if the public official owns the real property,
but the property is located within 500 feet, and not directly within, a
zone subject to land use approval? The California Fair Political Prac-
tices Commission dealt with this issue too during the last year.65 The
request for advice spurring this advisory opinion concerned Cupertino
City Councilmember Barry Chang, whose home lay within 500 feet of
the accompanying land dedication for a proposed eight and one-half
acre residential development to be approved by the City Council.66
The issue was that the development could adversely affect Chang’s
“pristine” view, as well as the councilmember’s property value.67
Beginning with the “penny test” analysis, the Commission’s Legal
Division noted that a public official has a conflict of interest if “the gov-
ernment decision in which he or she participates has a ‘reasonably fore-
seeable material financial effect’ on [the official’s personal] interests”—
even a “penny’s worth.”68 Then, surprisingly, the Legal Division
seemed to abandon its cut-and-dry materiality test in favor of a more
conjectural analysis, stating that financial effect cannot be measured
merely by actual change in property value, but that “the analysis
must also address how the potential for change is altered.”69 After con-
tacting a property appraiser to get more information on the potential for
change in local property values over time, the Commission concluded
that Councilmember Chang was not conflicted because the exact place-
ment of homes within the development had yet to be determined;
Chang’s property was oriented to the east of the city lights, not the
63. See id. at *2, 4.
64. See id. at *4-6.
65. See Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n Advice Letter, No. A-14-167, 2014
WL 5797808, at *5 (Oct. 8, 2014).
66. Id. at *1-2.
67. See id. at *5.
68. Id. at *3.
69. See id. at *5.
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west; and because Chang’s view of a ridge beyond the nearby pictur-
esque canyon would not be obstructed by the new construction.70
Examining the foregoing advisory opinions together, a clearer pic-
ture of what is considered ethically permissible in California emerges.
For a public officer, it is considered a disqualifying conflict to own
property subject to land use regulation by the governing body to
which that authority figure belongs. Yet, there is no conflict if the of-
ficial merely has a leasehold interest in the same property. The issue
becomes thornier when real property is adjacent to an area of develop-
ment. As of now, it would seem as though real property interests as
close as 500 feet do not necessarily disqualify owner-politicians.
This assessment comports with another advisory opinion issued by
the California Fair Political Practices Commission last year, which
opined that there was no conflict of interest for a board member,
whose property was located within 500 feet of a newly proposed proj-
ect to address flood control and other measures, to participate in the
matter despite an acknowledged collateral personal effect.71
III. Recusal and Disqualification
A. Partial Recusal
Following the denial of an “application to use a portion of their prop-
erty for storing wrecked and impounded vehicles,” Jimmy and Jill
Lewis of Siloam Springs, Arkansas, appealed, arguing “that a recused
board member’s continued participation in the application process de-
prived them of their due[]process rights.”72 Kenneth Knight, one of the
neighbors disputing the Lewis’ plan to open a towing business out of
their home, was subsequently appointed to the Benton County Plan-
ning Board and openly voiced his opposition to the permit application
during a Technical Advisory Committee meeting.73 Under a section
entitled “general public comments,” minutes from this meeting reveal
that Knight’s concerns were “the decreased properly values [the tow-
ing facility] would cause, the increased traffic through the neighbor-
hood, the nuisance created by lights and noises, and possible water
contamination.”74
70. Id. at *4-5.
71. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n Advice Letter, No. A-14-053, 2014 WL
1498287, at *5-6 (Mar. 26, 2014).
72. Lewis v. Benton Cnty., 436 S.W.3d 181, 181 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014).
73. Id. at 182.
74. Id.
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Knight did not attend the first public hearing in which the interested
application was discussed and recused himself on the day of the
vote.75 Still, Knight did join other neighbors in speaking against the
proposed use of the land during the Planning Board meeting, after at-
tending the meeting in an official capacity, and participating in the roll
call.76 The Board thereafter rejected the application in a 5-1 vote.77 On
appeal, the Benton County Circuit Court found “that although it prob-
ably could have been done differently, Knight did not abuse his discre-
tion as a Planning Board member.”78 The Court of Appeals of Arkan-
sas affirmed, showing that, in this part of the country, there is no
prohibited conflict where a planning board member recuses himself
from voting, but participates in the discussion of a conflicted issue.79
B. Total Disqualification
In Missouri, a faulty removal did not deprive the federal court of ju-
risdiction to disqualify counsel.80 The City of Greenwood had been
in a dispute with Martin Marietta Materials (Martin) over a rock
quarry located south of the city.81 The law firm of Zerger & Mauer
LLP served as Greenwood’s counsel throughout the litigation and
racked up over $4,000,000 in fees by the time the case was ultimately
settled. The settlement consisted of Martin paying Greenwood
$7,000,000 in exchange for truck access to Second Avenue and Green-
wood declaring that quarry traffic was reasonable and did not consti-
tute a nuisance.82
Not long after this settlement, Zerger & Mauer agreed to represent
“eighteen individual plaintiffs who held property interests on Second
Avenue . . . in [a] Missouri state court [action] against Martin,”
which sought “damages for a private nuisance, among other claims.”83
Martin removed the case and the district court, believing it had subject-
matter jurisdiction, entertained Greenwood’s prompt motion to disqua-




78. Id. at 183.
79. See id. at 184-85.
80. Zerger & Mauer LLP v. City of Greenwood, 751 F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2014).
81. Id. at 929.
82. Id. at 929-30.
83. Id. at 930.
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conflict of interest.84 “The district court agreed with Greenwood and . . .
disqualified Zerger & Mauer,” which appealed.85
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, yet upheld
the attorney disqualification.86 The appellate court reasoned that
“the district court’s inherent need to manage its bar and uphold the
rules of professional conduct [were] no less significant for the ‘main-
tenance of orderly procedure’ than . . . Rule 11 sanctions,” which were
within the district court’s authority.87 Further, because resolution of
Greenwood’s motion to disqualify was separate from the substantive
case, “the jurisdictional infirmity did nothing to disturb the district
court’s order.”88
The court went on to cite Missouri Rule of Professional Conduct
4–1.9(a), which “outlines the duties an attorney owes [to] former clients:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter rep-
resent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that per-
son’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.89
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court’s disquali-
fication order was appropriate.90 Of course, the order only governed
Zerger & Mauer’s representation in the federal proceeding and will
likely become an issue again when the matter heads back to state
court.91
South Dakota was the location of another interesting debate impli-
cating ethics and land use last year. There, the Eastern Farmers Coop-
erative (EFC) was granted a conditional use permit to build and oper-
ate an agronomy facility on approximately 60 acres of land located a
few miles north of Colton, South Dakota.92 The facility would store,
distribute, and sell a variety of farm products, including anhydrous
ammonia.93 The Hansons, whose residence was situated across from
the proposed facility, appealed and, at the appeal hearing, Minnehaha
County “Commissioner [Dick] Kelly disclosed that he had toured
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 931.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 932; see also MISSOURI RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 4-1.9(a) (2007).
90. Zerger & Mauer LLP, 751 F.3d at 935.
91. Id.
92. In re Conditional Use Permit No. 13-08, 855 N.W.2d 836, 838 (S.D. 2014).
93. Id.
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[a similar] facility [operated by EFC] and was impressed by the safety
measures in place.”94 Following the County Commission’s unanimous
decision to uphold the approval of the permit, the Hansons sought de
novo review before the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County.95
After holding a trial and hearing evidence, the circuit court found that
Commissioner Kelly’s tour of the related facility “constituted an [imper-
missible] ex parte communication that disqualified his vote.”96 How-
ever, finding no evidence of bias with the remaining three votes, the
court left the decision intact, holding that the Hansons’ position
would not have changed because the vote was unanimous.97 The Su-
preme Court of South Dakota agreed that Commissioner Kelly’s disqua-
lification did not require a new hearing and affirmed the circuit court’s
invalidation of Kelly’s vote as a sufficient remedy to cure the alleged
due process concerns arising out of his participation in the hearing.98
IV. Bribery, Censure, and Malpractice
The law firm of Cozen O’Connor P.C. found itself embroiled in a dis-
pute with a former client over its representation in a zoning matter.99
The Cherry Hill Market Corporation pleaded two causes of action in its
complaint, alleging that Cozen O’Connor “provided inadequate and in-
effective representation because [their] ‘objectives’ in the zoning mat-
ter were not achieved, and because a summary-judgment motion was
not filed by the court-imposed deadline in the unrelated litigation.”100
The trial court, however, dismissed the complaint without prejudice
due to insufficient allegations as to proximate cause, and because the
claim for ineffective representation in the zoning matter should have
been brought as legal malpractice instead of common law negligence
or breach of fiduciary duty.101 The appellate court agreed and ap-
plauded the trial court for “providently exercis[ing] its discretion.”102
Elsewhere in New York last year, after a career spanning more than
fifty years, one attorney’s gross neglect of a client matter led to a
94. Id.
95. Id. at 839.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 845.
99. Cherry Hill Mkt. Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor P.C., 118 A.D.3d 514, 514 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014).
100. Id.
101. Cherry Hill Market Corp. v. O’Connor, No. 154292/12, 2013 WL 1783552, at
*1-3 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 22, 2013).
102. Cherry Hill Mkt. Corp., 118 A.D.3d at 515.
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formal investigation and censure.103 The Grievance Committee of
New York filed a petition against Attorney J. Michael Shane alleging
that, in 1986, he agreed to represent a client on a contingent fee basis
against a municipality to recover damages for zoning regulations that
reduced the value of the client’s business.104 Shane stipulated that, “in
July 1986, [he] falsely informed [his] client that papers had been
served on the municipality.”105 From 1986 through 2012, Shane mis-
led his client into believing that he “was prosecuting the matter, and
[he] bolstered those misrepresentations with . . . false documents,
[which] include[ed] a purported court order and notice of appeal.”106
Over the years, Shane manufactured a myriad of excuses for the sub-
stantial delay until finally confessing to the client, in July of 2012, that
he had never actually filed the claim.107 The appellate court concluded
that the attorney committed numerous violations of New York’s Rules
of Professional Conduct, including: “engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; . . . engaging in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and . . . engaging in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness as a lawyer.”108
Determining that censure was the appropriate sanction, the appellate
court highlighted several mitigating factors, including the attorney’s
“otherwise unblemished record,” the fact that the attorney “did not
commit the misconduct for personal gain or profit,” that the attorney
voluntarily “self-reported [his] misconduct to the client,” and that
the attorney expressed remorse.109 Attorney Shane also fully cooper-
ated with the Grievance Committee’s investigation, and there was
no proof that the client suffered an actual financial loss.110 According
to the court, it appeared that the lawyer was just trying to avoid telling
the client that his claim lacked merit.111
Finally, bribery did not pay off for a lawyer-turned-politician who
traded permits for payoffs in New Jersey.112 During his campaign,
and after being elected Mayor of Hoboken, attorney Peter J. Cammar-
ano, III accepted monies from a cooperating witness disguised as a
103. In re Shane, 117 A.D.3d 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
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developer.113 For a $25,000 fee, the mayor agreed to “expedite[] zon-
ing approvals for unspecified construction projects.”114 Arrested after
just a month in office, Cammarano resigned as mayor and pled guilty
to one count of conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce by extor-
tion under color of official right.115 The now-former mayor was or-
dered to make restitution of $25,000 and sentenced to two years in fed-
eral prison, to be followed by two years of supervised release.116
“On the basis of the criminal conviction, the Office of Attorney Eth-
ics (OAE) filed a motion for final discipline with the Disciplinary Re-
view Board.”117 Though “[t]he OAE recommended disbarment . . . a
four-member majority of the [Board] voted [instead] to impose a
three-year . . . suspension” because Cammarano did not orchestrate
the scheme.118 The Supreme Court of New Jersey then granted the
OAE’s petition for review and ordered Cammarano’s disbarment.119
New Jersey’s high court rebuked Cammarano, calling his actions
“so patently offensive to the elementary standards of a lawyer’s pro-
fessional duty that they per se warrant[ed] disbarment,” and an-
nounced that “[g]oing forward, any attorney who is convicted of offi-
cial bribery or extortion should expect to lose his license to practice
law in New Jersey.”120 Thus, despite Cammarano’s previously unsul-
lied reputation, service to the community, contrition, and rehabilitative
efforts, “ordering any discipline short of disbarment [would] not be
keeping faith” with the court’s duty to the public.121
V. Conclusion
The Land Use Ethics Committee of the ABA Section on State and
Local Government Law strives to stay current by continually review-
ing and discussing relevant cases and opinions from around the coun-
try that implicate professional responsibility and ethical practices in
land use decision making. To ensure that land use proceedings remain
fair and transparent, we invite readers to assist in this effort by contrib-
uting to the discussion.
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